Small Wars Journal

In a recent Foreign Policy article, Gustavo de las Casas contends Destroying al Qaeda is not an option, yet. This discussion is found in different threads throughout SWC, and Mr. Casas makes a compelling case to keep them around.

Quote:
The old al Qaeda is no more. At least 40 percent of its leadership circa 2001 has either been killed or captured. New faces have fared no better; since July 2008, 11 of the organization's 20 most wanted have been put out of commission. And middle management is almost gone, many of them victims of Predator strikes. What remains is probably a hollow organization, represented by a core of insulated figureheads, such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, surrounded by eager cadres of jihadist newcomers. Before long, the West may just hold a barrel to al Qaeda's collective forehead. Should it press the trigger?

Gut instinct and righteousness scream "yes!" But a better answer might be "not yet." The world would be wise to keep al Qaeda alive, paradoxically enough, for security reasons. Like it or not, keeping a battered al Qaeda intact (if weak) is the world's best hope of funneling Islamist fanatics into one social network -- where they stand the best chance of being spotted, tracked, and contained. The alternative, destroying the terrorist group, would risk fragmenting al Qaeda into thousands of cells, and these will be much harder to follow and impossible to eradicate. It's the counterterrorist's dilemma, and the only real choice is the least unsavory: Al Qaeda must live.
I really enjoyed his article, but I'm still not swayed. My rebuttal goes back to the fundamentals of insurgency theory relying mainly on Mao's protracted war. Insurgencies and terrorist groups need several things:

1. Ideology- something to validate their worldview and actions
2. People- technical bomb experts, grunts, suicide bombers, etc
3. Guns
4. Money

If AQ fractures, then funding sources, recruiting bases, technical skills, and support networks and infrastructure decline thus diminishing the capabilities of follow-on organizations. Moreover, competition amoungst groups would cause additional infighting and diminished capabilities.

That's my take. Any thoughts?

Mike

Not sure if this has been posted on here before but one heck of a story.

No one expected Lieutenant Brian Brennan to recover after losing both legs to a roadside bomb, but one word from a general changed everything.
Video

It's about time. Documentary airs 15 Nov.

New jihad code threatens al Qaeda
Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, CNN

Quote:
Tripoli, Libya (CNN) -- From within Libya's most secure jail a new challenge to al Qaeda is emerging.

Leaders of one of the world's most effective jihadist organizations, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), have written a new "code" for jihad. The LIFG says it now views the armed struggle it waged against Col. Moammar Gadhafi's regime for two decades as illegal under Islamic law.

The new code, a 417-page religious document entitled "Corrective Studies" is the result of more than two years of intense and secret talks between the leaders of the LIFG and Libyan security officials.

The code's most direct challenge to al Qaeda is this: "Jihad has ethics and morals because it is for God. That means it is forbidden to kill women, children, elderly people, priests, messengers, traders and the like. Betrayal is prohibited and it is vital to keep promises and treat prisoners of war in a good way. Standing by those ethics is what distinguishes Muslims' jihad from the wars of other nations."

The code has been circulated among some of the most respected religious scholars in the Middle East and has been given widespread backing. It is being debated by politicians in the U.S. and studied by western intelligence agencies.

In essence the new code for jihad is exactly what the West has been waiting for: a credible challenge from within jihadist ranks to al Qaeda's ideology.

While the code states that jihad is permissible if Muslim lands are invaded -- citing the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine -- the guidelines it sets down for when and how jihad should be fought, and its insistence that civilians should not be targeted are a clear rebuke to the goals and tactics of bin Laden's terrorist network.